CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUPREME COURT NARROWS
SCOPE OF SUMMARY PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CONVICTIONS
Under its power to supervise the administrationof justice in the
federal courts, the Supreme Court has severely circumscribed the
use of summary proceedings to punish for contempt of court.

UNDER RULE 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure'
federal courts are permitted to punish summarily 2 certain forms
of criminal contempt. Amidst increasing criticism of the summary
procedure as being at variance with settled notions of due process
by offering opportunities for abuse of individual rights,8 the Su-

l "A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that lie
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in
the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and
shall be signed by the judge and entered of record." FED. R. Cum. P. 42(a).
The Advisory Committee's notes to the rules state that 42 (a) is "substantially a
restatement of existing law," Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, 18 U.S.C. Rule 42, at
app. 3766 (1964), as propounded in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888), where the
Court held that summary punishment was proper for the contemnor who physically
attacked a court marshal and brandished a knife, and Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925), where the Court held the summary procedure unavailable to punish an
alleged contemnor who sent a personally derogatory letter to the judge in chambers
even though this contempt constituted "misbehavior in the presence of the court"
and was thus within the meaning of the applicable statute.
'The procedure described by the word "summary" is perhaps most easily understood when viewed in distinction to the "procedural regularity" traditionally associated with criminal convictions. "We think 'summary' as used in this Rule does not
refer to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but refers to a procedure
which dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from
the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking
evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that
goes with a conventional court trial." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
3 Perhaps the greatest volume of critical writing from any one source is that of
Mr. Justice Black in his opinion for the Court in Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S.
399 (1956), and in his dissenting opinions in United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681,
724 (1964); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 620 (1960); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958); Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 396 (1957); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952). Mr. Justice Black feels that in most cases the
summary power is irreconcilable with a fair system of justice. He would apparently
treat these contempt proceedings as criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the
constitution, thus guaranteeing indictment by a grand jury and a jury trial. "When
the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury and disciplinarian are thrust
upon a judge he is obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly
.. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause." Green v. United
fair and true..
States, supra at 199. See 36 MINN. L. REv. 965 (1952); 99 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1951); 4
Wyo.L. REv. 120 (1949); 33 YALE LJ. 536 (1924).
Even though the procedures normally associated with criminal prosecutions are
noticeably absent in summary contempt cases, some earlier decisions nevertheless stated
that "no formal charge or writ or answer or trial was required. A summary inquiry
and a record of the finding and punishment were sufficient to constitute due process
of law." Brown v. United States, 196 Fed. 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1912). See Ex parte Terry,
128 US. 289, 309-10 (1888).
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preme Court in Harris v. United States4 recently decided to limit
application of rule 42 (a) to situations where immediate judicial
action is necessary to rectify contemptuous conduct exemplified by
such acts as threatening the judge with physical harm or seriously
obstructing court proceedings. 5
In Harris, the defendant had been convicted of criminal con-

tempt and sentenced to one year in prison for refusal to obey a
court order conferring immunity of prosecution and requiring him

to answer questions asked by a grand jury. 6 The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the contempt could not be
punished summarily under rule 42 (a). Rather, the "fair admin-

istration of justice" demanded that Harris be given notice and a
hearing pursuant to rule 42 (b), which is applicable in the federal
7
courts whenever use of summary procedures is not justifiable.

Unlike the formal notice and hearing provisions of rule 42 (b),

summary procedures in criminal contempt cases often proceed without notice, a hearing, an opportunity to prepare a defense and to
present and cross-examine witnesses, or a jury trial.8 The contempt

power has traditionally been justified on the grounds that it is either
"inherent"9 in any judicial establishment or that it is necessary to
'382 U.S. 162 (1965).
5Id. at 164.
'Id. at 163. The defendant had refused to answer the grand jury's questions on
the grounds of self-incrimination. After inquiry, a federal district court granted him
immunity from self-incrimination and ordered him to respond to the grand jury's
inquiries. The defendant again refused and was again brought before the judge, who
repeated the questions and ordered him to answer. Upon his third refusal Harris was
summarily adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. Ibid. The conviction was affirmed
in 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964).
7382 U.S. at 167.
FEn. R. CRIMf. P. 42 (b) provides: "A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time
and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense,
and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and
describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an
attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an
order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which
an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these
rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's
consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing
the punishment."
8 See, e.g., Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); Bisignano v. Municipal Court of Des
Moines, 237 Iowa 895, 23 N.W.2d 523 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 818 (1947).
' See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) (use of the summary contempt power upheld and termed inherent). Of the contempt power it has generally been said: "The
power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
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the preservation of courtroom order, the execution of court decrees
and the vindication of judicial authority. The propriety of using
summary procedures has traditionally been determined by a judicial
classification of the contempt as "direct" or "indirect,"' 1 the summary procedure being reserved for direct contempts. As a matter of
substantive law, a direct contempt generally requires that the conduct occur in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice.""
Since contempt procedures in the state jurisdictions are fairly
similar to those prescribed for the federal courts in rule 42,12
analogous abuses of the summary power have arisen in both the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration
of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and
invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power."
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
11The distinction is made in numerous cases, e.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S.
33, 42-43 (1941), and is essentially embodied in rule 42. Direct contempts are covered
by 42 (a), which requires that the judge certify "that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the
court." Fa.. R. CRiM. P. 42 (a).
Contempts are also more broadly classified as civil and criminal. Determinative
of the classification in each case is the purpose of the proceeding. A contempt is civil
when the purpose is to coerce the party to obey a court decree for the benefit of the
injured party; such a purpose is essentially remedial. Conversely, contempt is criminal
when the proceeding seeks to punish the contemnor in order to vindicate the authority
of the court. See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); State ex rel. Bliss v.
Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
2'Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (now 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964)).
"ZFor a review of the state statutes see Note, 15 VAND. L. Rlv. 241, 250-55 (1961).
A typical statute is that of Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-901 to -903 (1962), which
provides: "34-901. . . . Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for
criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts, and no others.
"First. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior, committed during its sitting,
in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings,
or to impair the respect due to its authority.
"Second. Any breach of the peace, noise or disturbance, directly tending to interrupt its proceedings.
"Third. Wilful disobedience of any process or order, lawfully issued or made by it.
"Fourth. Resistance, wilfully offered, by any person, to the lawful order or process
of the court.
"Fifth. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a
witness, and when so sworn, the like refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
"34903. ... Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court,
may be punished summarily; in other cases, the party charged shall be notified of
the accusation, and have a reasonable time to make his defense."
Some states have statutes specifically prescribing the procedure to be followed in
the case of a witness testifying before a grand jury. See, e.g., INn. ANN. STAT. § 9-822
(1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-918 to -920 (1964).
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state and federal courts. 1 3

The Supreme Court has already pro-

hibited several obvious abuses, 14 but more subtle ones still flourish.
For example, the preservation of the summary contemnor's right of
appeal has been cited as militating in favor of the argument that
the summary procedure is not unfair. Yet it has been shown that
the right may be illusory in some situations. 5 Further, while the
Supreme Court has said that summary contempt procedures are not
available in federal courts for the first refusal to answer a grand
jury's questions since the refusal does not occur in the actual presence of the court,' 6 states apparently may permissibly avail them13 The Court in Harris also based its conclusion on "'the concern long demonstrated by both Congress and this Court over the possible abuse of the contempt
power.'" 382 U.S. at 164, quoting from Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 54 (1959)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting): "A series of recent cases in this Court alone indicates that the
personal emotions or opinions of judges often become deeply involved in the punishment of an alleged contempt." Id. at 199 n.8, citing Yates v. United States, 355 U.S.
66 (1957); Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); Offutt v. United States, -348
U.S. 11 (1954); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Fisher v. Pace, 886 U.S.
155 (1949).
4 For example, one of the most glaring abuses was corrected in Yates v. United
States, supra note 13. In that case the Court was confronted with a finding of cumulative contempts with cumulative penalties for continued refusal to answer questions.
The Court found that only one contempt was involved and advised the district court
to alter its sentence accordingly. The defendant subsequently appealed again, complaining of the severity of the revised sentence of one year's imprisonment. The Court
again reversed, noting that the district court judge was merely trying to impose his
original cumulative sentence. The decision was reached by the Supreme Court, 356
U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam), only after the petitioner had spent seven months in
jail.
1
State v. Granchay, I Ohio App. 2d 307, 204 N.E.2d 562 (1964), illustrates this
point. For refusal to answer grand jury questions, the trial judge committed the
contemnors to prison with the right to purge themselves by answering. Under Ohio
law summary procedure was warranted only where the purpose of the remedy was
to coerce the contemnor to comply with court orders, but not where the purpose
was punitive. Id. at 309, 204 N.E.2d at 564. Since the contemnors had been committed
summarily, they could only be confined while the grand jury was in session, since it
was only during that period that the coercive remedy could be effective. The trial
judge, however, had made no such provision in his sentence, and they remained
imprisoned after the grand jury had terminated investigations. Id. at 311, 204
N.E.2d at 565. On appeal the court held that the act of dismissing the grand jury also
operated as an immediate discharge of the defendants. Ibid. Thus the court .determined that it had no jurisdiction on appeal. The appeals "are now, for practical
purposes, moot." Id. at 312, 204 N.E.2d at 565. Later in the opinion the Ohio court
adverts to the possibility of an even more egregious abuse, noting that a judge
might well purposely sentence contemnors in a manner similar to that used by the trial
judge. The court stated, however, that "we do not imply that this reservation of power
to defeat our jurisdiction was made maliciously or even consciously; it was merely an
inevitable concomitant of selection of the coercive remedy by the trial judge." Id.
at 312, 204 N.E.2d at 565-66.
20 Under rule 42 (a) the judge must certify "that he saw or heard the conduct
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selves of summary procedures upon the first refusal to answer in the
presence of the grand jury simply by denominating the grand jury
an "arm of the court."'17 This method of disposition is highly suspect. Since the grand jury proceeding is secret, the authority or
dignity of the court is not impaired in the eyes of the public and
18
therefore no need for summary disposition is present.
Compounding these abuses in both the state and federal courts
is the potential deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel
inherent in any summary procedure. 9 Often the contempt is adjudged before the contemnor has had an opportunity to elicit
advice from his counsel to determine whether the information
sought to be disclosed is confidential2 0 or even whether the answer
constituting the contempt . . . . FED. R. CaIM. P. 42 (a). See 382 U.S. at 169 nn.6-7
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion indicated that the very use of the summary procedure in
Harris may have been abusive. "The real contempt, if such there was, was contempt
before the grand jury-the refusal to answer to it when directed by the court. Swearing
the witness and repeating the questions before the judge was an effort to have the
refusal to testify 'committed in the actual presence of the court' for the purpose of
Rule 42(a). It served no other purpose, for the witness had been adamant and had
made his position known." 882 U.S. at 164-65. The dissent, however, per Justice
Stewart, viewed this occurrence as an attempt on the part of the judge to give Harris
the chance to purge himself and, hence, concludes that the procedure was equally
as fair as the rule 42(b) procedure. Id. at 170-71.
'1 The contemnor in State v. Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951), had
been ordered to answer by the judge. In dictum, however, the court observed: "The
grand jury, therefore, is a constituent part, appendage, or arm of the court, and a
contempt committed by any person in its presence is a direct contempt in the hearing
and presence of the court itself." Id. at 226, 52 So. 2d at 759.
Is "The facts shown by this record put this case outside the narrow category of
cases that can be punished as contempt without notice, hearing and counsel. Since the
petitioner's alleged misconduct all occurred in secret, there could be no possibility
of a demoralization of the court's authority before the public." In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 276 (1948).
In addition, the summary power is often viewed as inherently unfair in that the
sentencing judge himself must act somewhat precipitously. "[F]rom the severity of the
sentence here, it is clear that the judge was not advised how other judges were treating
similar offenses . . . . Apparently, the 15-month sentence in this case is the longest
contempt sentence ever sustained by an appellate court in the federal system for a
refusal to answer questions of a court or grand jury." 'Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41, 57-59 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
20 The Court intimated that this deprivation occurred in Harris. See 582 U.S. at
163 n.l.
It has been pointed out that the danger of abuse "is heightened by the fact that
the substantive elements of the contempt-the insulting tone, the provocative gesture
-are matters which do not usually appear on the record and on which appellate
courts usually take the word of the offended judge." 99 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 543
(1951). See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
o See, e.g., People v. Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126, 138 N.E. 291 (1923). In this case the
defendant was not only in a confidential relationship with the person about whom
he was being questioned, but he was also denied time to consult his counsel.
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is within his privilege against self-incrimination. 2 ' Advice of counsel would also seem desirable in order to apprise the contemnor
of the consequences resulting from his refusal to answer.
As a result of these abuses, the history of American experience
with summary criminal contempts is rife with indicia of the legislative and judicial dislike for the power and the consequent trend
toward narrowing its scope. Although the statutory grant of the
summary power to the federal courts was initially quite broad,22
Congress has subsequently limited the situations subject to the
power. On the one hand, Congress has defined the conduct which
can be punished summarily, 23 and, on the other hand, it has expressly exempted from summary procedures those contempts occurring during prosecutions under specified federal statutes.2 The
Supreme Court has also indicated its growing sensitivity to abuses
of the contempt power by providing minimal procedural safeguards
and by narrowing the area where the power can be exercised in
federal actions. The Court has guaranteed to persons charged with
2

1
See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), where the dissenting opinion
indicated that the court refused to allow counsel, who was seated in the courtroom,
to'intervene while his client was being questioned by the judge. Id. at 380 (Black, J,,
dissenting). The majority of the Court affirmed the contempt conviction. The case
presented The difficult question of whether there had been a waiver of the privilege
to refuse to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination and the complexity of this

inquiry, underscores the need for assistance of counsel.

12The Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 was the first statute
giving federal courts the power to punish contempts. The language was very broad,
allowing the courts, to punish generally all contempts of authority in any cause or
hearing before them. "[Clourts of the United States shall have power . . . to punish
by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all tontempts of authority . .'. Ibid.
'3 Glaring abuses of the summary power under the initial broad statutory grant
given the courts, note 22 supra, prompted Congresm to pass the Act of March 2, 1831,
ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487. The statute permitted the use of the summary procedure only for
certain delineated forms of conduct by certain prescribed persons. The availability of
summary contempt was limited to situations involving "misbehaviour of any person
or persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said courts in their
offidal transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts,
party, juror; witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts." Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99,
§ 1, 4 Stat. 488. This provision was substantially reenacted in the Act of June 25,
1948, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964). See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress 'Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study
in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 1024-26 (1924).
2
" E.g., The Clayton Act, ch. 373, § 22, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1964)
guarantees the right to a jury trial upon demand where the contempt is indirect and
also constitutes a crime under-any federal or state statute; The Norris-La Guardia Act,
ch: 90, §'11, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1964), guarantees the right to a jury trial
fdr',dntempt§. involving injunctions in labor disputes.
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indirect contempts the right to a hearing and to the presentation
of mitigating evidence. 25 It has buttressed the obstacles to finding a
direct contempt by interpreting the phrase "so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice" as a strictly geographical,
rather than causal, limitation. 26 And it has prescribed that a different
judge try the case when the presiding judge becomes personally em2
broiled with the contemnor. 7
The Harrisdecision represents a major extension of the Court's
guarantee of fair procedures in criminal convictions both by overruling prior law as expounded in Brown v. United States28 and by
drastically narrowing the scope of rule 42 (a). 29 In Brown, the Court
had held that summary punishment was proper for the witness who
refused to answer grand jury questions after being ordered to answer
by the Court. The Court in Harris quoted liberally from the
Brown dissent and overruled its earlier determination by an analysis
of the purposes of the summary procedure.3 0 "Rule 42 (a) was re'.Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 511 (1925).
28 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
21 offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). "But

judges also are human, and may,
in a human way, quite unwittingly identify offense to self with obstruction to
law .... These are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what constitutes
justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Id. at 14.
28359 U.S. 41 (1959).

"This conclusion seems warranted as a result of the Court's extremely narrow
interpretation of the situations rule 42 (a) procedure was "intended" to comprehend.
The Court's language indicates that the decision accomplished more than a mere
overruling of the factual holdings in Brown, which was nearly identical with that of
Harris. See 382 U.S. at 164-65, 167. The Brown inquiry had proceeded in traditional
form by noting that the contemnor had an unqualified duty to answer the grand
jury questions, that there was no factual dispute about the existence of "misbehavior," that there was no personal dispute with the judge and, hence, that all the
requirements of a literal reading of rule 42 (a) had been satisfied. 359 U.S. at 45-48.
The language of Harris,on the other hand, addresses itself primarily to the manner in
which summary disposition comports with the requirements of procedural regularity,
thus indicating a total re-examination of the rule 42 (a) procedure. See 382 U.S. at
164, 167.
30 The arguments the majority deemed controlling in its disposition of the case
included the limited purposes of the summary procedure, the departures from normal
procedure embodied in the summary power and the fact that the court in exercising its
summary power might be acting without full knowledge of extenuating circumstances
and thus might be depriving the contemnor of a "fair administration of justice."
382 U.S. at 164-67. To the dissenters the significant considerations compelling their
conclusion were the well-settled and simplified rule of Brown, the fact that there
is no reason to assume that the punishment under rule 42 (a) will be any more severe
than under rule 42 (b) and the contention that the procedure employed in Harris
was not unfair. Id. at 168-71. It is on this last point that the interpretations of the
members of the Court differed most widely. The majority viewed the reiteration of
the grand jury questions in the presence of the judge as merely an effort to have the
contempt recommitted in the presence of the court for the purposes of rule 42(a).
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served 'for exceptional circumstances,' ... such as acts threatening a
judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings."3 1
The Court concluded that the summary power was not justifiable
as a pervasive prerogative inherent in all courts;32 rather, its utilization was deemed proper only when "speedy punishment may be
necessary." 33 "In the instant case, the dignity of the court was not
being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tac384
tics had to be stopped.
This seemingly straightforward formulation of the scope of rule
42 (a), however, does not embody "clear and consistent guidance
to the federal judiciary." 35 The Court's statement that its only concern is "procedural regularity" 36 is apparently an acknowledgment
of the basically criminal nature of the proceeding: the primary
sanction being criminal, the minimal safeguards surrounding criminal trials should be observed. The only exception envisioned by
the language of the opinion is that necessary to the preservation of
the judicial institution itself. 37 In the recognized exceptional case
it is presumably the emergency which gives rise to the power.3 8 The
Court, however, did not specify the situations in which emergency
will outweigh the value of procedural regularity. The standard of
"necessity" hardly clarifies the decision, for the Court gave no
indication of what degree of necessity must exist in order to justify
summary procedures.
Further difficulty is raised by the opinion as a result of the Court's
Id. at 164-65. The minority saw this occurrence as offering an additional chance to
Harris to purge himself. Id. at 170.
31

1d. at 164.

22 See note 9 supra.
"382 U.S. at 164.
"Id. at 165.
"Id. at 168 (dissenting opinion).
36 Id. at 167.
7
3 1d. at 164, 167.
" Mr. Justice Black disagrees with the necessity argument. In his dissent in Green
v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), he noted that "the argument from 'necessity'
appears to rest on the assumption that the regular criminal processes . . . will not
result in conviction and punishment of a fair share of those guilty of violating court
orders... and by intervening between the court and punishment for those who disobey
its mandate somehow detract from its dignity and prestige . . . . Nothing concrete
is ever offered to support the innuendo that juries will not convict the same proportion of those guilty of contempt as would judges . . . . At the same time, and
immeasurably more important, trial by jury and in full compliance with all the other
protections of the Bill of Rights is much less likely to result in a miscarriage of justice
than summary trial by the same judge who issued the order allegedly violated." Id.
at 214-15.
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failure to pursue its own logic. If necessity is the only limitation
on procedural regularity, then notice and a hearing must be accorded whenever speedy punishment is not necessary to the proper
functioning of the judiciary. Even in the exceptional situation
where summary punishment would be proper under Harris,80 however, it is difficult to envision an occasion where normal criminal
procedures would not suffice to meet the situation. In fact, existing
procedural provisions which bar the use of summary procedures in
order to avoid their potential abuse seem to comprehend the situations where exercise of the power would be most necessary. For example, if the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism
of a judge, 40 or if the judge becomes personally embroiled with the
contemnor, 41 the judge is disqualified and the summary procedure
is unavailable. Moreover, it has been suggested that a court may
readily employ alternative remedies which are just as appropriate
as the summary power in the prevention of a repetition of the
contempt and simultaneously preserve the contemnor's procedural
safeguards.4 Consequently, under the view taken by the Court in
Harris,the necessity "to protect the judicial institution itself" would
never seem so great that summary punishment should be warranted.43 The practical effect of the decision then emerges as an
39"
. thoe unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42 (a) where instant action is
necessary to protect the judicial institution itself." 382 U.S. at 167. See note 7 supra.
"0See FD.R. uasih.P. 42 (b).
41 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1954).
42 "For the purpose of facilitating the progress of a trial, the contemnor might
be removed bodily from the courtroom. If this failed to deter him, a peace bond might
be levied; in the last resort, the contemnor might be imprisoned until the end of
the trial." Note, 15 VAND. L. Rav. 241, 265-66 (1961). See note 21 supra.
Federal statutes make special provisions applicable to federal courts for the
prosecution of indirect contempts that constitute criminal offenses under federal
or state laws. "[I]f the act or thing so done be of such character as to constitute also a
criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of any State
in which the act was committed, [such person] shall be prosecuted for such contempt
as provided in section 3691 ...... 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). The latter section [3691]
entitles the accused to a trial by jury upon demand. 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1964). This
provision obviously represents a legislative concern over the possibility of the crime
being subsumed within the contempt and being punished as a contempt without the
constitutional safeguards specified for criminal trials.
The Supreme Court has also limited the availability of the summary power under
a federal statute which permits summary punishment for "misbehavior of any of its
[the court's] officers in their official transactions." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2) (1964). In
Cammer V. United States, 350 ,US.
399 (1956), 8 HAstrlNGs L.J. 56, the Court decided
that an attorney is not an "officer of the court" and thus could not be summarily punished ,for contempt under that statute.
3Even where courts have in. fact found necessity to exist, courts often suspend
exercise of the power in deference to conflicting interests. For example, where 'the
contemnor's conduct in court would be prejudicial to the effectuation of a fair and
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extreme curtailment by indirection of the availability of the,summary contempt power in the federal courts.
While the majority did not specify the explicit basis for restricting the use of the summary contempt power, the decision was presumably based on the Court's supervisory power over the administration of federal criminal justice. 44 This conclusion finds support in
the Court's tendency to avoid constitutional questions when possible.45 The expressed concern for procedural regularity, however,
and the language adopted in disapproving of the summary procedure
in this case on grounds of fairness suggest that the summary power
may be limited to emergency situations as a matter of due process
of law.46 Thus, it is conceivable that the standard of the Harris
case may in the future be made binding upon the states under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4T
speedy trial, the contemnor would be subject to summary punishment. Rather than
adjudge the contemnor guilty at the time of the contempt, when it may be "necessary," courts seem more disposed to wait until the end of trial to cite for contempt
in order to avoid the equally prejudicial effect which such action might have on a
client or'jury during trial. Even though the jury could be removed while the contempt
was being summarily adjudged, the Court has noted that "only the naive and inexperienced would assume that news of such action will not reach the jurors." Sacher
v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 10 (1952). By the time the trial is over, however, it is no

longer necessary to invoke the summary procedure. But see Sacher v. United States,
supra, where the Court allowed the use of summary procedures after the trial had
been concluded. Id. at 10-11. The result would presumably be different under the
Harris rationale.

"See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). "[T~he scope of our
reviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal courts is not cotifined
to ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence." Ibid. The Court has relied
on its supervisory powers in prior summary contempt cases under rule 42 (a). See,
e.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954), 24 FORDHAM L. Ry. 144 (1955).
'""The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1986) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
"6"Our point is that a hearing and only a hearing will elucidate all the facts -and
assure a fair administration of justice." 382 U.S. at 167.
An interesting problem in this context is raised by the Court's quotation of a statement from Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925): "'Due process of law,
therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court,
requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable
opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation."' 382 U.S. at 166 n.4.
(Emphasis added.) Such language manifests the fact that the Court in Harris was
well aware of the due process objection to use of the summary power. Nevertheless,
by retention of the "exceptional case" in this quotation, the Court has presumably
indicated that the summary power does not violate due process when used to vindicate
direct contempts.

"I Should such a decision be forthcoming, the Court will be faced with the difficult
question of whether explicit standards of the Harris decision will be imposed in toto
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The possibility that the Harris holding may be elevated to the
constitutional level and be applied to the states finds support from
recent Supreme Court decisions strengthening procedural safeguards
in criminal convictions in analogous contexts.48 Moreover, several
basic substantive considerations also militate toward such a decision.
First, the summary procedure is an anomaly in the constitutional
system in that it guarantees only minimal procedural rights. Second, the harm threatened by the summary contempt power, fine
or imprisonment, is of singular magnitude.49 Third, there are
available to courts alternatives to the summary procedure which in
fact render the "necessity" of the summary power unconvincing.5 0
Finally, the burden on lower court efficiency, barring retroactive application, would be slight. In addition, the due process clause has
already been used to impose some limitations upon state discretion
to adjudge contempts summarily. The Supreme Court has held
it to be a violation of due process for a judge who had acted as a
one-man grand jury and before whom the alleged contempt had been
committed, to judge the contempt even though there was no personal
involvement. 51 The Court has also indicated in dictum that if the
upon the states. A similar question arose in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
where the Supreme Court applied a well-established rule of administration in the
federal courts--exclusion of evidence illegally seized under the fourth amendment-

to state criminal trials as a constitutional requirement under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655. The exclusionary rule had been made applicable to the federal
courts forty-seven years earlier in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
If the Court does extend the Harris holding to the states, it would seem likely that
the narrow standards established by the Court-summary procedures will be unavailable where the contemnor has refused to answer before a grand jury-would be
applied. The more difficult question is whether the broad rationale of Harris and its

requirement of necessity as a precondition to application of the summary procedure
will be extended to the states.

For an extensive discussion of the criteria applicable in due process adjudication,
see generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Newman, The Process of Prescribing

"Due Process," 49 CG&n. L. RIv. 215 (1961).
4'Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (impropriety of comment on defendant's
failure to testify); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (expanding guarantees of
counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (same); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (inadmissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure).
40 Mr. Justice Black noted in his dissenting opinion in Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165 (1958), that "since the adoption of the Constitution it [the contempt
power] has undergone an incredible transformation and growth . . . until it has
become a powerful and pervasive device for enforcement of the criminal law ....
All the while sentences imposed on those found guilty of contempt have steadily
mounted, until now they are even imprisoned for years." Id. at 207-08.
30 See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
51
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955). "Fair trials are too important a part
of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they
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penalty for the contempt is of sufficient magnitude the defendant
may be entitled to a jury trial.52
Regardless of whether the Harris rationale will be elevated to a
constitutional requirement, its possible retroactive application in
federal courts remains unresolved. A holding of retroactivity
would require that all contemnors convicted improperly under the
Harrisrationale be retried in a proceeding only after notice and a
hearing had been afforded. In Linkletter v. Walker,5 3 the Supreme
Court refused to apply retroactively the rule propounded in Mapp
v. Ohio54 which excludes the receipt of evidence in a criminal trial
if seized in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court denied retroactive application primarily because the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter undesirable police action
and not to insure fairness of trial procedures.5 5 Since the holding
prefer." Ibid. The Court had previously held in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948),
that such a "'judge-grand jury' cannot consistently with the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment summarily convict a witness of contempt for conduct in the
secret hearings." In re Murchison, supra at 133-34.
52 United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.12
(1964). "However, our cases
have indicated that, irrespective of the severity of the offense, the severity of the penalty
imposed . . . might entitle a defendant to the benefit of a jury trial ....... Ibid.
This dictum has subsequently been followed in some lower federal court cases.
E.g., Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also the
interpretation given the dictum in Randazzo v. United States, 339 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.
1964) (the court reversed and remanded to allow the district court judge to use his
discretion in deciding whether to follow the Barnett dictum). Presumably the dictum
means that a jury trial will be afforded if the sentence exceeds that provided for
petty offenses. United States v. Barnett, supra at 694-95 n.12; Reply Brief for the
Petitioner, pp. 14-15, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). To avoid practical
difficulties the court will have to decide "ahead of time whether this is likely to be
an aggravated or petty offense" in order to determine whether a jury trial is necessary.
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 17.
'5 381 U.S. 618 (1965); 15 Am. U.L. REv. 122 (1965), 17 HASTINGS L.J. 124 (1965),
41 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 206 (1965), 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 422 (1966), 68 W. VA. L. Rxv. 70
(1965).
"Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited
from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits
in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." 381
U.S. at 629.
a"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Concerning the purposes of the Mapp holding on the exclusionary rule, the
Court said: "[I]n each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial-the very
integrity of the fact-finding process. Here, as we have pointed out, the fairness of the
trial is not under attack. All that petitioner attacks is the admissibility of evidence,
the reliability and relevancy of which is not questioned, and which may well have had
no effect on the outcome." 381 U.S. at 639.
Increasingly courts are criticizing the Blackstonian theory of retroactivity, which
postulates that judges do not create law, but merely propound what has always been
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in Harriswas aimed directly at the fairness of the contemnor's conviction and sentence5 6 retroactive application might well be deemed
proper under the Linkletter standards. The gravity of the fundamental right to judicial action predicated upon bases other than
"isurmise or suspicion"57-a right with which the Supreme Court
was especially concerned in Harris-may impel the Court to apply
its decision retroactively.Bs . The right would appear to possess an
inherent value at least equivalent to the opposing considerations of
the iicreased burden on lower courts and the widespread change in
prior law, which Harris represents.
This .tentative conclusion as to retroactivity is, however, by no
means clear, for the Supreme Court has demonstrated a decided
tendency to .deny the retroactive application of its landmark dethe -true law, every decision thus being retroactive. See, e.g., Sisk v. Lane, 331 F.gd
235, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11,
14-15 (5th Cir. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). These
courts have instead viewed an overruled decision as governing for the period during
which it was in effect. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 15-16
(2d Cir. 1964), aff'd sub noma.Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); Gaitan v, United
States, 317 F.2d 494, 496-97 (10th Cir. 1963).
GoEven if it is admitted that the fact of guilt is not in question, since the court
itself is witness to the contemptuous conduct, the procedure prescribed by Harris will
be determinative of both the existence and nature of the sanction and the fairness
of the sentence may thus be appropriately questioned.
In this respect Harris is much more akin to the deprivation of counsel in Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963), than it is to the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence in Mapp v. Ohio since the pre-Harris procedure put the contemnor at Auch
a prejudicial disadvantage that it was impossible for him either to present a defense
or offer mitigating evidence. Nearly all federal courts have applied Gideon retro.
actively. See, e.g., Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524, 529-30 (3d Cir. 1964); 'United
States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.

998 (1964).

-

382 U.S. at 167.
A holding that Harris should be applied retroactively may well impose a burden
on lower court efficiency since it would require a retrial of all contemnors who had
been improperly sentenced under rule 42 (a). Because the length of criminal contempt
sentences has continually been increasing, see note 49 supra, the number of contemnors
who would be affected by a holding of retroactivity might thus be significant in
numerical terms.
The extent to which prior law had been relied on is also relevant to a determination of whether to give a decision which departs from prior law retroactive effect.
In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court found persuasive the fact that prior to Wolf v,
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the exclusionary rule was not generally followed in the
states. Since Harris reverses Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), retroactive
application of the Harris rule that summary procedures are not available on, the
refusal of the coniemnor to answer grand jury .questions will have a significant impact.
Presumably a substantial number of contemnors -were convicted summarily under
the Brown rule for refusing to answer grand jury questions. See 382 U.S. at 171 n.11
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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cisions in the period since Linkletter.59 A recent manifestation of
this attitude is Johnson v. New Jersey,0° wherein the Court refused
62
0
to apply the right-to-counsel standards of Escobedo ' and Miranda
in favor of individuals whose trials were begun prior to the date on
which those cases were handed down.y3 Crucial to the determination
in Johnson was the fact that the retroactivity of Escobedo and
Miranda would have required the retrial of a myriad of prisoners
convicted in the first instance under proper constitutional standards,
the drastic alteration' of which could not fairly have been foreseen.6 This consideration is likewise relevant to a discussion of a
speculative retroactivity problem in Harris,65 On the other hand,
a factor emphasized in Johnson, which may tend to distinguish
Escobedo-Miranda from the Harris situation, is the notion that the
probative value of evidence admitted in violation of the EscobedoMiranda test is not necessarily greatly suspect0 6 To the extent, however, that fundamental fairness would entail notice and a hearing if
Harris were elevated to constitutional doctrine, the withholding of
these elements would appear to strike at the very heart of the validity
of the contempt proceedings 67
Even though the Court's analysis in Harris is somewhat incomplete and the standards appear vague of application, the practical
result of the decision is to eliminate the possibility of many summary
contempt convictions in federal courts. To this extent the anomaly
of the summary power as an "exception" to the due process clause
has been removed by indirection. The removal of this anomaly
would be enhanced should the Court impose a similar restriction
upon the state courts, and the implications of the Court's language
would seemingly signal that result. Perhaps the initial experience
of the federal courts in administering the Harris rule will provide
some guidance in making the determination.

50 See, e.g., Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (refusal to apply retroactively the
rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which had held unconstitutional
a prosecutor's comment on the failure of a defendant to testify).
0o 384 U.S. 719 (1966).

O Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63 384 U.S. at 734.

641d. at 731.
0 See note 58 supra.
"See 384 US. at 730.
"7See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.

